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Abstract
This paper examines how preference correlation and intercorrelation combine
to influence the length of a decentralized matching market’s path to stability. In
simulated experiments, marriage markets with various preference specifications
begin at an arbitrary matching of couples and proceed toward stability via the random mechanism proposed by Roth and Vande Vate (1990). The results of these
experiments reveal that fundamental preference characteristics are critical in predicting how long the market will take to reach a stable matching. In particular,
intercorrelation and correlation are shown to have an exponential impact on the
number of blocking pairs that must be randomly satisfied before stability is attained. The magnitude of the impact is dramatically different, however, depending
on whether preferences are positively or negatively intercorrelated.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C78, C15, P41
Keywords: Marriage matching, stability, random paths.
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Introduction.

Despite the success of centralized matching procedures in the markets matching new doctors
to residencies (Roth and Peranson, 1990) and city children to public schools (Abdulkadı́roğlu,
Pathak and Roth, 2005; Abdulkadı́roğlu, Pathak, Roth, and Sönmez, 2005) most matching markets remain decentralized. While there are many reasons why these markets are not centralized,
it is an open question whether or not decentralized matching markets actually manage to attain
stable outcomes. A stable matching is one in which no group of matched agents would prefer to
be with each other rather than those they are currently matched with. In one-to-one two-sided
matching problems (also known as marriage matching problems), such pairs of agents are known
as blocking pairs because they are able to block the match by breaking relationships with their
current partners and instead matching with each other. Stability is a critical characteristic for
any matching market for obvious reasons, and thus a vast literature has been dedicated to the
study of deterministic mechanisms that are guaranteed to reach such outcomes (see Roth and
Sotomayor (1990) or Roth (2008) for surveys). The problem of course is that this literature is
for the most part inapplicable to markets that are not centralized.
Yet there is good reason to believe that decentralized matching markets can indeed achieve
stability. In particular, the work of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) outlines a random process by
which any one-to-one two-sided matching market can converge to a stable outcome. Beginning
from any initial matching of agents, the process goes step by step, randomly selecting one blocking
pair from the set of all existing blocking pairs at any step and allowing them to pair with each
other while leaving their former partners single. Roth and Vande Vate (1990) show that this
process converges to a stable matching with probability one in a finite number of steps, and their
results are generalized (with some minor restrictions on preferences) by Klaus and Klijn (2007)
to the case of many-to-one matching with couples, and by Kojima and Ünver (2008) to the case
of many-to-many matching problems. Furthermore, Eriksson and Häggström (2008) show that
even in cases of incomplete information, stable matchings can still be attained by decentralized
processes given certain restrictions on preferences and some degree of search effort.
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Thus, it is at least possible for stability to be obtained by a decentralized process of agents
simply making and breaking partnerships over time. But in many situations, forming new
partnerships over and over again is not a trivial exercise. Though individuals may be willing
to quit their jobs to obtain more preferable employment and employers may be willing to fire
employees to hire better help, it is generally not a process they wish to engage in frequently since
forming new partnerships often requires significant sunk costs from both involved parties. At
the least such a process necessarily involves some expenditure of the ultimate scarce resource:
time.
The aim of this paper is to identify and quantify relationships between agents’ preferences and
the length of time necessary to achieve stability in matching markets as measured by the number
of steps taken in the decentralized random process defined by Roth and Vande Vate (1990).
Obviously, in this sense larger markets with more participants will have longer paths. Large
markets require more steps because they have more blocking pairs to satisfy. Here, however,
the number of participants is held fixed while the preference structure of participants varies.
Preferences are fundamental characteristics of any matching market since they directly determine
which outcomes are stable, and it therefore seems prudent to evaluate their impact on the length
of decentralized paths to stability.
The relationship between preference structure and matching market outcomes has only recently gained much attention, probably because the vast amount of variety and complexity that
preferences can entail tends to limit theoretical results to rather extreme cases. Examples of such
work include Wilson (1972) and Knoblauch (2008), who find limiting results for upper and lower
bounds respectively on men’s partner satisfaction in marriage problems when men propose to
women in a deferred-acceptance algorithm (see Gale and Shapley, 1962) and men’s preferences
are random.
Taking advantage of simulation techniques, however, recent work has been able to go beyond
the limitations of theory to analyze match outcomes with more flexible preference characteristics.
Caldarelli and Cappoci (2001) and Celik and Knoblauch (2007) use simulation methods to ana-
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lyze the relationship between preference correlation and men’s and women’s partner satisfaction
in marriage problems, while Boudreau and Knoblauch (2007) examine the relationship between
intercorrelation of preferences and partner satisfaction in marriage problems. Teo, Sethuraman
and Tan (2001) use simulation to investigate the potential for strategic misrepresentation in
marriage markets. All four papers restrict attention to the case of centralized matching, using
the men-propose deferred-acceptance algorithm to find stable matchings. In a different but related framework, Alpern and Reyniers use simulations to examine how perfectly intercorrelated
(1999) and perfectly correlated (2005) preferences alter bilateral search/accpetance strategies in
populations seeking mates.
This paper uses simulation methods akin to those in Boudreau and Knoblauch (2007) to
examine just how long a random path to stability is likely to be for a (one-to-one and two-sided)
marriage matching market, given the market’s preference structure. Simulation experiments
begin by randomly generating agents’ preferences with specific levels of correlation and intercorrelation, and then assigning agents to an arbitrary initial matching. The path to stability then
proceeds by identifying all possible blocking pairs and satisfying one of them at random, with
each pair having an equal chance of being chosen. The process then repeats until no blocking
pairs exist.
Regression analysis of the simulated data shows that both correlation and intercorrelation
have an exponential impact on the length of the market’s random path to stability. When all
agents on one side of the market agree on which partners on the other side are most attractive
(preferences are correlated), the path to stability tends to be relatively short. If agents on one side
of the market rank highly those on the other side who reciprocate their preference (preferences are
positively intercorrelated), the path to stability is even shorter. If, however, agents prefer those
on other side of the market who do not prefer them (preferences are negatively intercorrelated),
then the path to stability can be quite long. These results thus help to characterize which
types of matching markets could benefit most from centralized mechanisms that facilitate their
progress toward stability.
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Preliminaries.

The model considered here is the simple marriage matching problem, popularized by Gale and
Shapley (1962). There are two finite and disjoint sets, M = {m1 , m2 , . . . , mn } and W =
{w1 , w2 , . . . , wn }, of agents known respectively as men and women that are seeking to match
with each other1 . Each agent has a complete, strict, and transitive preference ordering over
the n agents on the other side of the market and the prospect of remaining single. Each man
i’s preferences are represented by a one-to-one and onto ranking function rmi : W ∪ {mi } →
{1, 2, . . . , n + 1}, where wj is preferred to wk by mi if rmi (wj ) < rmi (wk ). Women’s preferences
are similarly represented by rw . Here, as in the basic marriage matching model, the option
of remaining single is always the least preferred option, so rmi (mi ) = n + 1 for all men and
rwj (wj ) = n + 1 for all women. Letting R ≡ {rm1 , . . . , rmn , rw1 , . . . , rwn } be the set of all agents’
ranking functions, the model is therefore specified by {M, W, R}.
The outcome of a marriage problem is a matching of men to women, represented by a oneto-one and onto function µ : M ∪ W → M ∪ W . A matching is said to be stable if there
does not exist a blocking pair {mi , wj } such that µ(mi ) 6= wj but rmi (wj ) < rmi (µ(mi )) and
rwj (mi ) < rwj (µ(wj )). As proved by Gale and Shapley (1962), at least one such matching will
always exist in the case of marriage markets, and the set of all such matchings is known as a
particular market’s stable set. Furthermore, as proved by Roth and Van Vate (1990), stability
can be reached from any initial (unstable) matching in a finite number of steps via the following
process:
Step 1. Find all possible blocking pairs existing in the current match, µt .
Step 2. Randomly select one of the blocking pairs, {mi , wj }, and satisfy them by matching
them together so that µt+1 (mi ) = wj . If {mi , wj } were not single in µt , this leaves their
former partners, µt (mi ) and µt (wj ) single in µt+1 . Note that in the current model, this
pair is necessarily then a blocking pair for the next round.
1 Alternative interpretations categorize the sets as firms and workers, or workers and machines.
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.
Step k. Repeat steps 1. and 2. until no more blocking pairs exist.
If more than one stable matching is possible for {M, W, R} (as is often the case), then the
outcome that realizes from this decentralized process depends on the initial starting point and
which particular blocking pairs end up being satisfied along the way.
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Experimental Settings.

3.1

Preferences.

Preferences for individuals can be as complicated and varied as individuals themselves. Ultimately in matching markets, however, all that matters is that agents can indeed rank their
prospective partners. Markets can then be categorized according to how the agents’ individual
ranking lists compare with each other. If men (women) all tend to agree on which women (men)
are most and/or least preferable, then their preferences are positively correlated. Perfunctory
examples include the possibility of all men agreeing on which woman is the most beautiful, or all
women agreeing on which man is the best provider. If agents across sets have preferences related
to each other in some way, then their preferences are intercorrelated. An example of positive
preference intercorrelation is the tendency of both men and women to prefer those with similar
educational backgrounds. A possible example of negative intercorrelation, on the other hand,
could be poor men strongly preferring wealthy women while wealthy women prefer only wealthy
men. Of course, as even these simple examples illustrate, the two concepts are often intertwined.
Because of the many varied types and degrees of correlation and intercorrelation, as well
as the many degrees of combination between the two, theoretical results on the effects of these
characteristics are difficult to obtain beyond extremely rigid cases and assumptions. To perform
a more general examination of the effects of preference correlation and intercorrelation on a
marriage market’s path to stability, the approach here follows that of Caldarelli and Capocci
(2001) and Boudreau and Knoblauch (2007), simulating the matching process of many experi6

mental markets and analyzing the results. The critical difference between this paper and those
previously mentioned, of course, is the use of a decentralized (random) mechanism rather than
the centralized deferred-acceptance algorithm.
As in Boudreau and Knoblauch (2007), individual agents in each experimental market are
endowed with preferences by the following equation (1), which shows the score given by mi to
wj .
m
m
Xi,j
= ηi,j
+ U m Ijm + V m |i − j|n

(1)

m
m
For any wj , wk ∈ W , rmi (wj ) < rmi (wk ) if Xi,j
< Xi,k
, with women forming preferences
w
according to a symmetrically specified score Xi,j
.
m
The first term on the right-hand-side of equation (1), ηi,j
, represents the unique preference

of mi for wj , and is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. The next two terms
introduce a degree of correlation to the preferences of agents from the same set. Ijm is another
uniform random draw from [0, 1], but one that is common to all men. Together with U m , which is
an adjustable weighting parameter, the second term represents the common degree of preference
for wj that is shared by all men. A higher value for U m means a higher degree of correlation for
men’s preferences. The final term in equation (1) introduces intercorrelation across the groups
of men and women. The term |i − j|n = min{|i − j|, n − |i − j|}/ n2 is the normalized distance
of mi from wj when they are placed on an n-hour clock at hours i and j respectively. If V m is
negative then men like women closest to them, while if V m is positive men prefer women further
away from them. Intercorrelation between the two sets depends on the signs of both V m and
V w ; when both are of the same (opposite) sign, preference lists will be positively (negatively)
intercorrelated.

3.2

Measurement.

Simulation data is gathered by generating preferences for a market of fixed size according to (1),
randomly assigning the n men and women for an initial matching, and then proceeding according
to the decentralized process outlined in section 2. Blocking pairs are selected at random, with
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each possible pair having an equal likelihood of being chosen, and the length of the path to
stability is measured by the number of blocking pairs satisfied. Because the path can be quite
long, a relatively small market size of n = 10 men and women is used for most of the analysis,
but eventually is allowed to vary.
Preference correlation and intercorrelation are controlled in simulations by varying the parameters {U m , U w } ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and {V m , V w } ∈ {−2, −1.5, −1, −0.5, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}. 100 independent trials are conducted for each ordered 4-tuple {U m , U w , V m , V w }, with results presented
as the average over trials. In addition to altering the preference parameters, however, it is also
necessary to measure the actual levels of correlation and intercorrelation in agents’ realized preference lists. Since the realized lists are in part stochastically determined, although the specified
parameters are heavily influential they are not complete descriptors.
Fortunately, more general measures of preference correlation and intercorrelation have already been devised and are available for use. To measure correlation, the present analysis therefore employs the definition of Celik and Knoblauch (2007), denoting correlation in men’s and
women’s lists by ρm , ρw ∈ [0, 1] with a larger number indicating a larger degree of correlation.
The measure of intercorrelation across men’s and women’s lists is as defined by Boudreau and
Knoblauch (2007), and is denoted by Φ ∈ [0, 1]. A value of Φ = 0 indicates perfectly negative
intercorrelation, a value of Φ = 1 indicates perfectly positive intercorrelation, and a value of
Φ = 0.5 indicates neutral intercorrelation. Complete descriptions of these measures are available
in the appendix of this paper, or in the original citations.
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Results.

The analysis proceeds in four steps, first considering the effects of intercorrelation and correlation
separately, then considering the two together, and finally taking market size into account. To
examine the relationship between preference intercorrelation and the length of the market’s path
to stability, figure 1 illustrates the simulated data as arranged by the logged number of steps on
the path. From this data, two characteristics are immediately evident.
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Figure 1: Simulation Results on Intercorrelation

1. The level of intercorrelation has an exponential impact on the length of a market’s random
path to stability, suggesting a relationship of log(T ) = α0 + α1 Φ. Estimates of α0 and α1
are presented on the right side of figure 1, along with the linear trends they imply.
2. The effect of positive intercorrelation (Φ > 0.5) is drastically different from the effect
of negative intercorrelation (Φ < 0.5). Such asymmetric effects are consistent with the
results of Boudreau and Knoblauch (2007), who find a similar relationship for preference
intercorrelation and the size of marriage market’s stable set.
Together and simply put, these observations suggest that when more stable sets are possible
to reach the time taken to actually reach one in a decentralized fashion increases dramatically.
An increased number of stable outcomes means that the random selection of blocking pairs can
entail switching back and forth in terms of direction toward any outcome in particular. There are
thus two avenues for preferences to affect the length of a market’s path to stability: by increasing
the total number of blocking pairs and by complicating the path with twists and turns. The
following two examples serve to illustrate these effects.

9

Example 1. Consider a marriage market of n = 3 in which men most strongly prefer women that
have the same indices as themselves, so rmi (wi ) = 1 for all i = 1, 2, 3. Preferences are negatively
intercorrelated, however, because women most strongly prefer men with indices different than
their own. In particular, rw1 (m3 ) = rw2 (m1 ) = rw3 (m2 ) = 1. With the remaining rankings are
arbitrary, this market has at least two possible stable matchings: {(m1 , w1 ); (m2 , w2 ); (m3 , w3 )}
and {(m1 , w2 ); (m2 , w3 ); (m3 , w1 )}.
Suppose for simplicity that the market begins with all agents unmatched and proceeds toward
stability by randomly satisfying blocking pairs. Since remaining unmatched is all agents’ least
preferred option, any two agents constitute a blocking pair in the market’s initial state. Suppose
then that the first pair to be satisfied is (m1 , w1 ). Though this pair is a member of one of the
stable sets, it can be broken by the blocking pair (m3 , w1 ), a pair that is also included in one of
the market’s stable sets, because w1 prefers m3 to all others and m3 prefers w1 to being single.
This matching can similarly be broken up, however, by the blocking pair (m3 , w3 ). That pair
can then be broken by the pair (m1 , w3 ), which can in turn be broken by the pair (m1 , w1 ) to
complete a full circle.
Because the two sides’ preferences are negatively intercorrelated, a cyclical pattern is possible
in this case despite the fact that each pairing involved belongs to one of the market’s stable sets.
No matter which pair is formed, one member always prefers to be matched with an agent that is
not their current partner. Thus, if that preferred agent happens to be single at the time, there
is always a chance that the pair will be broken up.
Example 2. Now consider a very similar market with the same men’s preferences, but with
women’s preferences positively intercorrelated so that rwi (mi ) = 1 for all i = 1, 2, 3. In this case
there is only one possible stable outcome: {(m1 , w1 ); (m2 , w2 ); (m3 , w3 )}. Cycling is still possible
on this market’s path to stability depending on the remaining preference orderings, but once any
pair belonging to the stable set is formed it can not be broken. The path to stability is therefore
dramatically shortened since those two agents can no longer be involved in any blocking pairs.
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Figure 2: Simulation Results on Correlation

Next, the relationship between the correlation of men’s and women’s preferences and the
length of the market’s path to stability is illustrated in Figure 2. Because the effects of the two
genders’ preferences are symmetric in the case of the decentralized process studied here (which
is certainly not the case for most centralized mechanisms, especially the oft-studied deferredacceptance mechanism), correlation in the market as a whole is simply categorized by adding
the correlation scores of men and women.
Due to the intermingling effects of intercorrelation, the impact of correlation is not as readily
apparent on its own when considering all 2025 data points that result from all permutations of
{U m , U w } ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and {V m , V w } ∈ {−2, −1.5, −1, −0.5, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}. Thus, the right
side of Figure 2 depicts simulation results for V m = V w = 0, with {U m , U w } ∈ [0, 3] in increments of 0.25. Holding intercorrelation more or less constant in this manner, the effects of
correlation become more evident. Like intercorrelation, correlation in preferences also exponentially reduces the number of blocking pairs satisfied before reaching a stable match. This effect
is not always present, however, as it levels off once the aggregate correlation in the market becomes high enough. With sufficient correlation, not many blocking pairs are likely to exist, so the
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path to stability is a relatively short trip from any initial matching. The estimated coefficients
presented on the right side of figure 2 are therefore based only on data with ρm + ρw = 0.8.
Based on the two previous treatments of preference intercorrelation and correlation separately, the following is speculated as the joint relationship between the length of a market’s path
to stability and its fundamental preference characteristics:

log(T ) = β0 + β1 Φ + β2 (ρm + ρw ).

(2)

Given the asymmetric effects of intercorrelation, however, estimation of equation (2) is conducted
separately for Φ < 0.5 and Φ > 0.5. These results are presented in table 1.
For the most part the estimated coefficients have signs and magnitudes that justify with
earlier results. Intercorrelation is the more dominant influence whether it is positive or negative.
In fact, the coefficient on preference correlation is generally not significant in the presence of
positive intercorrelation. The explanation for this absence of an effect lies in the fact that the
path to stability is already quite short when intercorrelation is neutral (Φ = 0.5). In accordance
with figure 2, correlation’s effects tend to taper off quickly. This also serves as an explanation
for the lopsided impact of intercorrelation; the path to stability can only be so short.
To complete the analysis, market size must also be taken account. A larger market will
obviously entail a longer path to stability, but how much longer? And how are the effects of
preference structure altered when more agents’ preferences are involved? Simulations of larger
markets are difficult because of the tremendous complexity their paths can entail. Table 1 does
present estimates with relatively small variations in market size, however, indicating that a larger
number of participants can mean a pronounced increase in the effects of preference structure.
Again, the case of preferences being negatively intercorrelated is quite different from the case
of positive intercorrelation. As the size of the market increases, the increase in the impact of
intercorrelation is drastic when intercorrelation is negative, but only moderate when intercorrelation is positive. The effect of correlation also differs from case to case. Though its influence
is small it does grow consistently with market size in the case of negative intercorrelation, but
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Φ < 0.5
n=4
n=6
n=8
n = 10
n = 12
n = 14

Table 1:
β0
3.4931∗
(0.0542)
8.5785∗
(0.1214)
15.8055∗
(0.2433)
26.4963∗
(0.3956)
37.8565∗
(0.9174)
51.5427∗
(1.4629)

Estimated Coefficients from Equation (2)
β1
β2
Φ > 0.5
β0
-3.4361∗
0.0166
n=4
2.6566∗
(0.1314)
(0.0143)
(0.0933)
-11.4942∗
-0.0774∗
n=6
4.6613∗
(0.2790)
(0.0298)
(0.2433)
-24.3367∗
-0.2097∗
n=8
5.8852∗
(0.5611)
(0.0629)
(0.4522)
-44.2547∗
-0.4015∗
n = 10
6.7929∗
(0.9297)
(0.0993)
(0.3802)
-65.5858∗
-0.5336∗
n = 12
7.3628∗
(1.9134)
(0.0993)
(0.8093)
-91.5156∗
-0.8097∗
n = 14
7.6192∗
(3.0022)
(0.1400)
(0.8515)

β1
-1.9455∗
(0.1488)
-3.9010∗
(0.3917)
-4.9997∗
(0.7399)
-5.8009∗
(0.6240)
-6.2975∗
(1.3549)
-6.2143∗
(1.4231)

β2
0.1110∗
(0.0168)
0.0100
(0.0456)
-0.0548
(0.0804)
-0.1060
(0.0708)
-0.0505
(0.1141)
0.1167
(0.1191)

Standard errors in parentheses, * indicates 99% significance level.

remains irrelevant regardless of market size when preferences are positively intercorrelated.
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Discussion.

The appeal of the decentralized process considered here lies in its similarity with real-life market
functioning. Partnerships are often made hastily and then dissolve if and when better opportunities present themselves. Thus, the question addressed by this paper is the following: how
long is such a process likely to take before stability is attained? If the answer is exceptionally
long, and if making and breaking relationships is costly or if time is considered a scarce and
valuable resource, then that provides substantial justification for an increased use of centralized
mechanisms in matching markets.
It turns out that the length of a market’s decentralized path to stability hinges critically on
the market’s general preference characteristics. When the two sides of a matching market are
fundamentally opposed, with agents on one side preferring those agents from the other side that
do not prefer them, the market’s path to stability is likely to be quite long. Even a small degree
of common ground is therefore vital if stability is to be attained in both a decentralized and
timely manner. Just a bit of positive intercorrelation across the preferences of a market’s two
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sides can mean a relatively short path to stability.
Moreover, those markets with fewer stable outcomes tend to converge more rapidly to stability. A high degree of correlation in the preferences of one or both sides of the market is therefore
also instrumental for a shorter path. If both genders’ preferences are perfectly correlated, for
example, then there is obviously only one possible stable outcome and the market is likely to
reach it very quickly without any external coordination. A note of irony, however, is that in this
case stability presents the least gain for the market as a whole. When both genders’ preferences
are perfectly correlated, no matter what matching is attained one member will always receive
their first choice, one will always receive their second choice, and so on. Thus, in the case when
stability is easiest to reach in a decentralized fashion, it matters least to the market’s overall
welfare.
Finally, in addition to characterizing which types of matching markets are most in need of
centralized mechanisms to facilitate their progress toward stability, this paper also reveals an
interesting avenue for future theoretical research.
In the simulation experiments presented here, agents behave according to their own true
preferences, always making an improvement if the opportunity presents itself. The potential
length of the market’s path to stability, however, may mean that some agents are better off
quitting while they are ahead, leaving the market once they obtain an adequate mate. There
may be some strategic element to agents’ decisions regarding which blocking pairs they are
willing to be a part of. Though previous work has studied similar questions of acceptance rules
for the extreme cases of perfectly correlated (Eeckhout, 1999; Alpern and Reyniers, 2005) and
perfectly intercorrelated (Alpern and Reyniers, 1999) preferences, the question remains open
for the general case of preferences and in the more general decentralized matching environment
presented here. The potential for such manipulation is far from trivial, since an outcome that
is stable to the market’s true preferences may then be prevented from occurring. Thus, the
question of how a decentralized matching market may evolve in the presence of more sophisticated
behavior is not addressed in this paper, but presents a research agenda for the future.
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6

Appendix.

The measure of preference correlation used in this paper comes directly from Celik and Knoblauch
Pn
(2007). As in their paper, Avei = n1 j=1 rwj (mi ) is the average ranking of mi by all n women,
so the total measure of correlation in women’s preferences is
Pn
k
(Avei)k − n( n+1
2 )
Pn k
,
ρw = i=1
n+1 k
i=1 i − n( 2 )
where k ≥ 2. All experiments here use k = 9, as recommended by Celik and Knoblauch (2007).
The measure of correlation in men’s preferences, ρm , is defined symmetrically.
The measure of preference intercorrelation used here comes directly from Boudreau and
Knoblauch (2007). First, for each man i, square the difference between the rank mi gives wj
and the rank wj gives mi and add over all women:

φmi =

n
X

(rmi (wj ) − rwj (mi ))2 .

j=1

Then sum across the men and divide by n to get
Pn
φave =

i=1

n

φmi

.

Finally, the score is normalized by using the maximum possible φave score that is obtained when
no two men agree on the rank of any woman and each man is ranked last by his first-ranked
woman, second last by his second ranked woman, third last by his third ranked woman, etc.
Pn
Φ=

(n + 1 − 2k)2 − φave
k=1
Pn
2
k=1 (n + 1 − 2k)

Perfect positive intercorrelation therefore yields Φ = 1 and perfect negative intercorrelation
yields Φ = 0.
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